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The Role of Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centers in Asia-Pacific Networks: 
Evidence from Firm-Subsidiary Connections 
Abstract:  
This paper adds a network dimension to locational theories on multinational corporate strategy 
to explain how tax havens and offshore financial centers (THOFC) are integrated into the 
structures of firms listed on five stock exchanges of the Asia-Pacific region. Applying network 
analysis to firm-subsidiary connections of these listed firms, it highlights differences in the 
connectivity structures as well as the role of THOFC in exchange subnetworks. It finds 
considerable variation in the complexity of corporate structures by stock exchange can be 
explained by national context and multinational location strategies, and that the prevalence of 
THOFC within corporate structures cannot be underestimated.  
 
Keywords: Tax havens; Offshore Financial Centers; Social Network Analysis; Economic 
Geography; Financial Markets 
 
Introduction  
The position of tax havens and offshore financial centers (THOFCs) in multinational firm 
networks is an increasingly germane research topic due to the strong role these jurisdictions 
play in global capital flows. Their emergence as a component of corporate operations is not 
new, but their role as key actors shaping global financial flows has risen dramatically. 
According to Damgaard et al. (2018), THOFCs harbor $7 trillion in private wealth and $12 
trillion in corporate wealth through corporate shells, accounting for 40% of global foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Alstadsaeter et al. (2018) estimate that the equivalent of 10% of global 
gross domestic product (GDP) is held in tax havens, or 8% of household financial wealth ($7.6 
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trillion in 2007). Though widely perceived to be a ‘failure’ in governance (Wojcik, 2013) or 
tied to illicit funds (Aalbers, 2018), the fact that most – if not all – of the world’s largest 
corporations pursue tax minimization strategies in some form through THOFCs renders them 
worthy of both further research and better theorization.  
Within the international business (IB) literature, research on THOFCs has focused primarily 
on tax and regulatory regimes (Fitchner, 2016; Kemme et al., 2017); firm strategy and 
advantage (Cobham et al., 2015; Sutherland et al., 2012); and, the nature of foreign direct 
investment (Andreff, 2016; Palan et al., 2009). However, with the exception of a few key texts 
(García-Bernardo et al., 2017), there is a dearth of literature on the geographical drivers and 
networked processes of corporate structures relating to THOFCs. Scholars have noted that the 
geographical distribution of multi-national corporation (MNC) activity is influenced by a 
variety of determinants, including producer and consumer markets, regulation, and access to 
factors of production including labor, resources, and capital (Yang, & Coe, 2009; Yeung, 
2014). Much of this is based on research emerging from the 1960s, which theorizes the MNC 
as an outgrowth of the global capitalist order focusing initially on the ‘foreign’ operations of 
‘domestic’ firms and later turning to more comprehensive and complex theorization (cf. 
Buckley, 1985). Indeed, the ease with which flows of capital now transcend national 
boundaries in the digital era has rendered the geographical structure of MNCs more and more 
complex, being driven by individual firm strategy as well as factors specific to industry sectors. 
As intensifying neoliberalization has broken down territorialized national production systems, 
MNC are increasingly incorporating THOFCs into their operational networks (Desai, & 
Dharmapala, 2006; Roberts, 1995; Schotter et al., 2017).  
Against this backdrop, this paper analyzes the role of THOFCs in five firm-subsidiary 
locational networks derived from the MNCs listed on five Asia-Pacific stock exchanges: the 
Australian Securities Exchange, Bombay Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
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Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange. The resultant analysis applies network 
analytics to understand the role THOFC within firm networks. It finds that differences in 
national context appear to be reflected in how MNCs strategically globalize which, when 
aggregated, reveal the global nature and arrangements of THOFC flows. The Asia-Pacific 
comparative approach reveals differences across varieties of capitalism in the countries of this 
study. We conclude that it is apparent through the different network structures that national 
context and MNC strategies both impact how firms globalize and the role of THOFCs therein.  
 
The Role of Location and Networks in the International Business (IB) Literature  
The IB literature has provided a core analytical framework for more than half a century, 
focusing on a number of interrelated dimensions including firm strategy, competitive 
advantage, regulation, and change over time (e.g. Buckley, 1985; Caves, 1974; Dunning, 2014; 
Dunning, & Lundan, 2008; Fan et al., 2016; Markusen, 1995). Within IB, the Ownership-
Location-Internalization (OLI) framework (Dunning, 2001) provides an ‘eclectic’ theory 
detailing why and where firms expand internationally. Through its various iterations of theory 
over the past decades, the ‘location’ component of OLI has been perhaps most neglected 
(Dunning, 2014; Buckley, 1985), possibly owing to the fact that analyses of locational factors 
have been divided between regional scientists, geographers, and business scholars.  
In general, theories of MNC activities from a business or economic theoretical perspective seek 
to explain ‘both the location of value-adding activities, and the ownership and organization of 
these activities’ (Dunning, & Lundan, 2008, p.79). (Neo)classical spatial economics of the 
1950s focused on examining the question of ‘where’, making broad assumptions on the spatial 
fixity of resources and labor, and the increasingly influential role of the firm in directing cross-
border transactions as driven by profit motives. However, as neoliberalism further eroded the 
relevance of national boundaries in ‘containing’ firm activity, scholarship in the 1970s and 80s 
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began to explore the question of ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Dunning, & Lundan, 2008). This situated 
MNC activity geographically.  
Though location is critical to explaining firm strategy and economic systems, networked 
perspectives have recently made considerable inroads in providing evidence as to how global 
economic systems are structured. Research on corporate networks has thus proposed shifting 
the focus from traditional dyadic relationships (firms investing in other countries on an ad hoc 
basis) to a larger context of network relationships. Alderson et al. (2010), Wall and van der 
Knaap (2011) and Taylor et al. (2014), for example, employ techniques developed for the 
analysis of networks to evaluate how locations are linked together by MNCs in terms of the 
positions they occupy and roles that they play in those firms’ corporate networks. 
The notion that firms interact across the globe through various production and consumption 
networks shaped by different political and institutional structures is by now a well-accepted 
premise in a variety of academic disciplines, given the decades of research by theorists 
exploring corporate globalization (Dicken, 2011), neoliberalization (Peck et al., 2018), world 
city networks (Sigler & Martinus, 2017; Taylor, & Derudder, 2018) and global production 
networks (Coe et al., 2004; Yeung, & Coe, 2015). Empirical research drawing on these 
understandings is broad in methodological scope and data, but largely focuses on spatial 
network patterns of global corporate activities. Collectively, this literature theorizes how the 
globalization processes associated with power and control have shaped economic relations and 
production networks. More recent studies have expanded beyond the initial focus on ‘global 
cities’ towards alternative geographic areas and industry sectors (e.g., Krätke, 2014; Robinson, 
2002; Grant, & Nijman, 2002).  IB has also begun to explore how social network analysis can 
inform understandings of MNC operations and strategies, such as the influence and role of 
inter-locking directors (e.g. Guo, & Lv, 2018) and value creation processes of international 
networking (e.g. Vedel, & Servais, 2017). This body of work remains largely outside of the 
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geographic or locational context, with studies dealing the identification of locations rather than 
the connection between them (e.g. McCarthy, & Dolfsma, 2016). As such, drawing on MNC 
strategic operational and locational decision-making literature from the respective international 
business and global cities research fields is highly relevant to progressing understandings of 
global economic networks and flows. 
 
The Emergence of Asia-Pacific Multinational Firm Activity 
While the number and geographic diversity of MNCs has steadily risen, some argue that the 
distribution of global corporations – particularly those listed on the world’s largest stock 
exchanges – remains concentrated in the economies of North America, Western Europe and 
Japan (Forsgren, 2013; Rugman, & Verbeke, 2004). There has nonetheless been a degree of 
change to this concentration, with emerging Asian economies becoming fast-rising hubs for 
global firm headquarters, and by corollary corporate knowledge and innovation. For example, 
four of the top ten, and nine of the top 20 stock exchanges ranked by market capitalization are 
now in the Asia-Pacific region, and many of the most significant industry giants are Asian. 
Unlike many Western firms, one notable feature of Asia-Pacific MNCs is that a relatively high 
proportion are either state-backed or state-owned, particularly in the case of China (Andreff, 
2016). While large Japanese and Korean firms (e.g., Toyota, Samsung, Sony, LG) have long 
been household names, large Chinese (e.g., Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, Xiaomi) and Indian (Tata, 
Infosys) firms have increasingly caught the attention of both commentators and researchers 
(Williamson, & Yin, 2014). 
The distribution of global MNC activity to some degree mirrors underlying economic 
processes. Rugman and Verbeke (2004) argue that most MNCs are regional rather than truly 
global in their locational strategies. For example, many MNCs demonstrate a strong home-
regionalization because economic activities within the home market are operationally cheaper, 
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more efficient and easier than across several markets. In addition, MNCs appear to follow a set 
of common rules with differences relating to their own national particulars (Andreff, 2016). 
For example, Australian MNCs have been found to strongly pursue locational strategies 
associated with the country’s colonial links to the United Kingdom and geographic links to the 
Asia-Pacific (Kim, & Gray, 2017; Taylor et al., 2013). Meanwhile, technology-intensive 
MNCs from emerging economies seek to locate where there are knowledge competencies, 
given these are often weaker in their home economies (Crescenzi et al., 2016). Some MNCs 
seek access to particular markets. For example, Indian MNCs locate in developed nations to be 
closer to clients as their technological capabilities rise (Andreff, 2016); Japanese firms are 
found to take into account the uncertainties of a nation’s policy environment in expansion 
decisions (Delios, & Henisz, 2003); and, Chinese MNCs to use Australia as a testing ground 
for capacity building as its markets resemble that of the major triad economies but with a 
smaller economy allowing for faster feedback mechanisms (Fan et al., 2016).  
In many cases, the markets of this region are considered emerging, operating according to very 
different dynamics than other areas of the world (Hemmert, & Meyer-Ohle, 2014; Roca, 2018). 
Hemmert and Meyer-Ohle (2014) note that where emerging economies in Asia-Pacific 
formerly were receptors of FDI from more advanced regions, they are now FDI investors 
themselves with very different investment seeking behaviors. Furthermore, the socio-
economic, political and institutional diversity of these nations have fostered different industry 
profiles, maturities, and firm structures compared to the more established markets in Europe 
and the US. For many of these nations, Western laissez-faire assumptions of the invisible hand 
may not hold true, as firms exist within a strong developmental state, or as large conglomerate 
corporate traditions often linked to family structures. For example, the traditional keiretsu 
system in Japan interlocking corporate relations and shareholdings through centuries will 
influence how these corporations engage in buyer and supplier markets (Horn et al., 2010). 
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Furthermore, as Buckley (1985) contends, the mercantilist model pursued by Japanese firms 
differs from the US model, which focuses more on factor inputs and production costs. The 
export-led focus of the Japanese industrialization was to some degree replicated by the Asian 
‘Tigers’ of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and more recently by China and 
Vietnam.  
The export-led economic model was driven in South Korea by its large chaebol whose steeped 
family origins are linked politically (Jun et al., 2010), and for the strong social networks also 
known as guanxi in China (Hutching and Murray, 2002). These traditional links shape both 
domestic and global connections (cf. Steirer, 2009), including inhibiting or directing global 
expansion as is the case in the largely state-owned or influenced corporations of China. These 
national variations translate into different spatial patterns by sector or nation as firms globalize, 
for example, as shown by the energy sector in Australia (Martinus et al., 2015) or the ICT 
sector in India (Mir, & Mir, 2005). 
To date, research on the geographies of corporate networks in the Asia-Pacific region has been 
surprisingly limited (cf. Derudder et al., 2018; Horner, 2014; Lai, 2012; Yang, & Coe, 2009; 
Yeung, 2014), and that on THOFC in the region has been largely confined to the fields of 
political economy, law, and economics (Brook, & McGrew, 2013; Buckley et al., 2010; 
Fichtner, 2016). However, as the global economic center of gravity shifts toward the Asia-
Pacific region, so should the focus on the role of THOFC for MNCs operating there allowing 
a better understanding of just how global the ‘tax issue’ is.   
 
Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centers 
While this and related research seeks to identify relative differences in how MNCs globalize, 
the fluidity of contemporary corporations implies that MNC structures are in practice much 
8 
 
more complicated. One driving factor has been the rising importance of strategic tax 
‘optimization’, and in particular transactions involving THOFC, which total approximately 15 
per cent of all nations (Dharmapala, & Hines. 2009) and mediate at least 30% of global FDI 
stock (Haberly, & Wojcik, 2015). Given the recent proliferation of papers on the topic 
(Haberly, & Wójcik, 2015; Janský, & Prats, 2015; Jones, & Temouri, 2016; Wójcik et al., 
2018), THOFC are increasingly recognized as key actors in global financial flows, processes 
of globalization, as well as the greater mobility of goods and services (Hong, & Smart, 2010).  
While no formal definition exists, THOFC are jurisdictions offering benefits to individuals, 
trusts, or corporations. Their legal and regulatory frameworks often obscure ownership through 
opaque special purpose vehicles (SPVs) or through restrictive secrecy laws, low oversight, 
flexible ownership (e.g., shareholder, trustee) structures, and – most importantly – low or no 
tax on profits, earned income or dividends (Palan et al., 2009). Though much is known about 
the distribution of MNCs, considerably less is known about those operating in THOFC. Firms 
themselves are reluctant to reveal their corporate location strategies as many would fall into a 
grey area of compliance. This has meant that research on THOFC is encumbered by inadequate 
access to data, as well as the obvious pitfalls of surveying firms or industry experts on the 
subject.  
As THOFC functions increase in complexity, neither ‘tax havens’ nor ‘offshore financial 
centers’ is an entirely accurate term. The former suggests that taxation is the only reason firms 
incorporate in such jurisdictions, and the latter that these are mainly small island nations (e.g., 
Bermuda, Vanuatu) somehow detached from the core global economies. While García-
Bernardo et al. (2017) argue that the most significant ‘offshore’ financial conduits are core 
territorial states of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland, 
many THOFC are small nation-states or territorial dependencies not prominent in global 
rankings. One defining feature of THOFC is their outsized role in corporate structures (cf. 
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Baldacchino, 2018; Briguglio, 2010). Indeed, they were central figures in the 2008/09 Global 
Financial Crisis as much of global investments often ended up in their jurisdictions (Palan et 
al., 2009).   
THOFC are distinct from other ‘nodes’ in MNC networks as firms typically have minimal to 
no physical presence. They are increasingly under scrutiny (Zucman, 2015), due to their 
prevalence and the simplicity by which firms today transfer funds across borders compared to 
the past. Indeed, Cobham et al. (2015) argue that the geography of THOFC and off-shore 
financial flows is best understood by the level of secrecy they provide through lack of 
information exchange and transparency. The ‘digital firm’ of the new millennium can move 
capital and labor between countries, as well as create corporate structures highly favorable to 
offshoring profits. Uber, for example, is incorporated in the Netherlands and operates globally 
through local subsidiaries. Amazon and Paypal’s European headquarters are in Luxembourg, 
while those of Facebook and Google are in Ireland. Taxation is further obfuscated by complex 
structures that direct revenues and profits offshore. Many ‘American’ or ‘Chinese’ holding 
companies are in fact registered in the Cayman Islands or British Virgin Islands, despite their 
operations being distributed primarily between North America, Europe, and Asia. National 
governments, as well as international organizations such as the OECD and IMF, are 
increasingly aware of the magnitude of the ‘problem’, and have begun acting to collaborate on 
tax harmonization and compliance issues (Forstater, 2018; Kemme et al., 2017). 
In addition to the socio-political ties embedded within the geographical relations of THOFCs, 
firm strategies determine the selection processes. The range of such transactions is complex, 
with some strategies focusing on reducing taxable profits, and others on booking debts that can 
be written off of tax liabilities. A number of related processes are deployed within these 
structures, such as ‘base erosion’ and ‘profit shifting’ which ‘refers to tax avoidance strategies 
that exploit gaps in mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations’ 
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(OECD, 2018). Transfer pricing is a subset of profit shifting in which firms ‘internally’ shift 
revenues or profits to jurisdictions with more favorable tax conditions. Merchanting and 
merchandising is similar, but with another firm taking ‘intermediary’ ownership or possession 
of goods. For example, in Hong Kong, these two mechanisms alone accounted for $540 billion 
in goods trade in 2016 (HKSTATD, 2018), and are related largely to tax avoidance on 
shipments going to or from mainland China. ‘Round-tripping’ and ‘capital-augmentation’ are 
other strategies, involving the transfer of funds to an offshore jurisdiction and then immediately 
back again. This enables anonymity and access to special ‘foreign investor’ tax and other 
concessions (Sutherland et al., 2012). Others have suggested that in many cases capital-raising 
takes priority over tax-related motives (Sutherland, & Matthews, 2009).  
 
Data and Methodology 
Despite the importance of THOFC to the global network, there is limit knowledge of how they 
are positioned within MNC firm networks. This section details the application of network 
analysis to understand this within Asia-Pacific corporate networks. To this end, we treat 
countries as strategic ‘nodes’ in the global economy that mediate the redistribution of capital, 
information, and resources. Firms make strategic decisions to locate headquarters, branches, 
and/or subsidiary locations internationally in order to gain some advantage related, in this case 
primarily in terms of taxation.  
Methodologically, we take parent-subsidiary locations and transform them into geographic ties 
to form MNC networks. Analyzing and comparing the emergent network structures produces 
insight into how locations are differentially embedded in the global economy. This approach 
has been most commonly applied in ‘world city network’ research, where a broad range of 
corporate datasets are used to understand the different structural positions of cities within inter-
city networks (e.g., Alderson et al., 2010; Hennemann, & Derudder, 2014; Krätke, 2014; Sigler, 
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& Martinus, 2017). We adopt this approach, but as our interest is in THOFC, our geographical 
lens is on ‘countries’ rather than cities. 
Five corporate networks were constructed from a database of headquarters and subsidiary 
national locations of firms listed on each of the five respective Asia-Pacific major stock 
exchanges: Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
Each exchange network is assumed to information on how firms of different countries 
globalize, with the national importance of different industries of a stock exchange reflecting a 
nations’ dominant sector (Martinus et al., 2015).  
Firm data was extracted between mid-2016 and mid-2017 to reflect all active listings on the 
ASX, BSE, SSE, SZSE, and TSE. Headquarter and subsidiary location data were sourced from 
a variety of commercially available databases, including Osiris (Bureau van Dijk), Bloomberg, 
Central Depository Service, and Morningstar, with subsidiaries matched to parent corporations 
using the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) - a code unique to each global 
listing. The five exchanges together represent a total of 9451 listed firms and 193,322 
subsidiaries. Approximately six per cent of these subsidiaries were identified as being located 
in THOFCs. Country codes were derived from firm International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN) codes, the first two letters of which generally designate a 2-digit ISO country 
code. As a list of fully sovereign states would miss a significant proportion of the world’s 
THOFC (e.g., Hong Kong, Bermuda), countries were designated by their ISO code. However, 
although British dependencies such as the Cayman Islands and BVI were included, data for the 
Channel Islands (Jersey and Guernsey) and Isle of Man were unavailable.  
THOFC jurisdictions were identified using interrelated references to THOFCs, and related to 
types defined by Palan et al. (2009). Banking secrecy hubs, such as Turks and Caicos, shield 
their clients from having to disclose information to outside parties. Market entry conduits, such 
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as the Netherlands and Ireland, provide lower tax rates compared to others within their trading 
bloc, notably the European Union. Incorporation centers, such as Montserrat and Panama, are 
places with relatively lax corporate laws, allowing clients to incorporate offshore without 
having bona fide local operations. Others are known for registration: for example, many of the 
world’s shipping companies use Liberia and/or the Marshall Islands to register their vessels. 
There are also differences between the clients of THOFC. Monaco, Gibraltar, and Switzerland, 
for example, actively target high net worth individuals (HNWI), while trusts and funds operate 
in jurisdictions with low corporate, or capital gains, taxes, such as Luxembourg and Singapore. 
There are also industry-specific niches including Guernsey for insurance and reinsurance, 
Luxembourg for funds, and Ireland and the Netherlands as market entry conduits for large 
firms. In this study, THOFC were identified by one of three source lists generated by the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), the OECD, or on five or more global ‘watch 
lists’ compiled by Palan et al. (2009). A total of 50 jurisdictions were included, divided almost 
evenly between (mostly) small nation-states, including Costa Rica, Barbados, Switzerland, 
Belize, and Bahrain, and smaller territorial dependencies, in large part British overseas 
territories and crown dependencies. These include the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle 
of Man, and Bermuda, among others. Large nation-states with certain sub-national tax benefits 
were not included, notably the United States, for which Delaware fulfils this role, and Malaysia, 
which includes Labuan.  
Parent-subsidiary inter-country links, as the relational building blocks of each of the five 
network, were ‘spatialized’ by assigning a directed location link or tie between parent company 
to subsidiaries. Therefore, a link was drawn between any pair of countries when at least one 
parent company was located in a country with a subsidiary in the other country. For example, 
a Thai subsidiary to a Japanese parent company would constitute a Japan–Thailand tie. 
Furthermore, a weight 𝑤𝑖𝑗, indicating the strength of the relationship between country 𝑖 and 
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country 𝑗, was added to each link by counting parent-subsidiary pairs between correspondent 
nodes. For example, if a parent company located in country 𝑖 has three subsidiaries located in 
country 𝑗, there is a threefold increase in the weight 𝑤𝑖𝑗. Finally, self-loops were removed, so 
that only connections given by companies having parent and subsidiaries in different countries 
was retained. The above procedure gave rise to five undirected weighted networks 𝐺(𝒱, ℰ), 
where 𝒱  and ℰ  are, respectively, the set of 𝑁 = |𝒱|  nodes and the set of 𝐾 = |ℰ|  links 
associated to the considered stock exchange. In order to study the role of nodes within these 
networks and identify the key countries, three centrality measures were considered: the degree 
(DC), eigenvector (EC) and betweenness (BC) centrality (Latora et al., 2017). The first measure 
is a structural one, and it is the most basic topological characterization of a country within the 
network, measured in terms of number of connections (degree). More precisely, the DC of a 
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒱 is defined as: 





𝑗=1       (1) 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 are the elements of the adjacency matrix 𝐴 ≡ {𝑎𝑖𝑗} of 𝐺, whose entries are either 
ones if (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ ℰ , or zeros otherwise. As a generalization of the DC, we considered the 
eigenvector centrality, which is based on the notion that connections to high-scoring nodes 
contribute more to the centrality of a node. In particular, for a node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒱, the EC is given by: 
  𝐸𝐶𝑖 = 𝑢1,𝑖       (2) 
where 𝑢1,𝑖 is the ith component of the eigenvector 𝑢1 associated to the eigenvalue 𝜆1 of  𝐴, 
such that it satisfies 𝐴𝑢1 = 𝜆1𝑢1. In our network specification, a high EC means that a country 
is connected to many countries who themselves have high scores. Betweenness centrality 
complements DC and EC by exploring how much ‘control’ a country has over the network 
structure as shown by the number of shortest network paths passing through it. For every pair 
of nodes in a connected graph, there exists at least one shortest path between the nodes, such 
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that the number of links that have to be traversed in order to reach one node starting from the 
other is minimum. The BC for a node 𝑖 is defined by using the number of these shortest paths 
passing through it. In particular, for a node 𝑖 the betweenness centrality is given by: 









𝑗=1;  𝑗≠𝑖     (3) 
where 𝑛𝑗𝑘 is the number of shortest paths from node 𝑗 and node 𝑘, while 𝑛𝑗𝑘(𝑖) is the number 
of these shortest paths containing node 𝑖. In addition to these three complementary centrality 
measures, we explore the community structure of the networks by using the Blondel algorithm 
(Blondel et al., 2008), while the ForceAtlas2 algorithm (Jacomy et al., 2014) 1 was used to 
produce the final layout of the visualizations. 
Eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, and degree centrality were all considered to 
better understand the overall network structures (see Appendix). However, ultimately, due to 
the simplicity of the BSE and SZSE in particular, degree centrality proved to be the most useful, 
measuring direct connections rather than intermediation (betweenness) or connectivity to other 
highly connected nodes (eigenvector). This remainder of this paper discusses the findings of 
this analysis of the five networks. 
 
Geographies of Asia-Pacific Corporate Tax Strategies 
The distribution of industry sectors varies significantly from one exchange to another in a 
sample of 11 of the world’s largest exchanges. For example, the domination of firms in the 
materials and energy sectors on the ASX (figure 1) reflects Australia’s strength and global 
competitiveness in the mining and energy sectors (Martinus et al., 2015). Similarly, the SZSE 
is dominated by manufacturing firms, and the BSE hosts a large number of industrials, 
                                                 
1 This algorithm was used to preserve the central position of nodes with a high connectivity to the core. The parameter with 
the best trade-off regarding disposition of the node and figure readability was selected. 
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especially in chemicals, textiles, and the like. Though somewhat similar, the key difference 
between the SZSE and SSE is that the former lists smaller and less well-established firms. The 
TSE is heavily concentrated on financials such as banks, and is distinguished by a strong 
presence in automobiles and components.  
INSERT FIGURE 1  
Each of the figures (2-6) in this section represents visually how nations are connected within 
each stock exchange network, with node sizes determined by degree centrality and the 
thickness of connecting edges denoting the tie strength between two nations. The distance of a 
node to other nodes relays information regarding the strength of the relationship. For example, 
the node at the core of the network is the primary node. Nodes closer to this node are relatively 
more important to the network as a great number of connections to the central node pull it 
relationally closer. For the 2 denser networks (ASX and TSE), we used a k-core decomposition 
(Alvarez-Hamelina et al., 2006) to reduce the network to 3 nested cores: with the 1-core being 
the full network and the 3-core the inner core of just a few nodes.  
The ASX network (figure 2) appears more complex than some of the other Asia-Pacific 
networks, highlighting the more sophisticated corporate spatial structures as well as larger sizes 
of the listed firms. In terms of bridging nations, New Zealand, Bermuda, Papua New Guinea 
and the UK play an important role, demonstrating the importance of both geographical 
proximity as well as other forms of proximity generated from factors such as colonial ties (cf. 
Martinus, & Sigler, 2018).  
The most significant THOFCs within the network are Singapore, Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, 
BVI, Ireland, and the Netherlands. This likely represents a mix of strategies, including one of 
Asian subsidiaries of Australian firms (Singapore, Hong Kong), onshore ‘conduits’ (Ireland, 
Netherlands) of capital, and offshore ‘sinks’ through SPVs. Though many of the subsidiaries 
in Singapore and Hong Kong represent bona fide local, or at least regional, economic activities, 
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the 155 Australian subsidiaries in Cayman Islands and 135 in BVI are unlikely to appear as 
brick-and-mortar offices for the most part. Drilling down into which specific industries are 
implicated, we find the sectors of financials, materials, consumer discretionary, and 
information technology to be the most significant. In particular, materials plays a substantial 
role, with various ASX firm subsidiaries in Hong Kong, Singapore, BVI, and Cyprus. Using 
the proportion of total inter-country connections as a proportion of outward connections, 
Bermuda and BVI both emerge as significant, with headquarters in the former connecting to 
subsidiaries in Australia, South Africa, Hong Kong and BVI, and BVI subsidiaries connecting 
to Australia and Papua New Guinea - in both cases related to the structures applied by mining 
companies such as Northwest Resources, Oklo and Nyota, and oil companies such as Oil 
Search and Horizon. The strong connection between China and the Cayman Islands was also 
apparent in the ASX, as subsidiaries of Macquarie Group including China Medical System, 
China Mengniu Dairy, and China State Construction were all corporates in the Caribbean 
jurisdiction. Several funds and mining-related companies on the ASX were also incorporated 
subsidiaries in Bermuda, as were holding companies for several large conglomerates including 
shareholders in a large global television syndicate and another holding a major hotel franchise.  
The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) (figure 3) network is highly centralized with all listed 
companies connected directly to India – an indication of the lower level of globalization 
relative to other exchanges, as well as its strong government-led sector. It is particularly 
strongly connected to the USA and UK, with Indonesia, Panama and China also slightly more 
connected than other nations of the network. The role of THOFC was least apparent on the 
BSE, and likely linked to the ‘degree’ of globalization exercised by locally listed firms, a 
number of other points reinforce this observation. India’s links to THOFC were primarily 
through subsidiaries in Singapore, UAE, Mauritius, Netherlands, and Hong Kong. Thus, unlike 
many of the other networks which are highly focused on the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of Cayman-
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Bermuda-BVI, firms listed in India exhibited a strong preference for THOFC closer to home. 
In particular, both the UAE (Dubai) and Mauritius are well-known as offshore centers for 
Indian firms as both have a significant diaspora from the subcontinent as well as sustained 
commercial links.  
The BSE’s key industries with THOFC relations are industrials, materials, and information 
technology. The UAE and Mauritius are significant in all three industries, whereas subsidiaries 
in the Netherlands mainly are in information technology and telecommunications and health 
care, demonstrating the Netherlands’ conduit role rather than as a sink for offshore profits.  In 
other words, just as Ireland provides a conduit for India-listed firms in financials to Europe, 
the Netherlands provides favorable conditions for knowledge-intensive industries. BSE-listed 
firms situating in tax havens ranged in size and composition.  One example is Adani, a large 
conglomerate known in part for its energy arm. Adani has fully-owned subsidiaries in the UAE, 
Mauritius, Singapore, US and Australia. Another is Fortis, one of India’s largest healthcare 
providers, which has subsidiaries in Mauritius, BVI, Cayman Islands, UAE, Macao, and Hong 
Kong, among others. Thus, although these are nominally MNCs, their activities follow 
relatively specific patterns where their operational entities (e.g., mines, hospitals) are 
financially separated from arms-length firms.   
The SSE (figure 4) and particularly SZSE (figure 5) network structures demonstrate a low level 
of globalization compared to the firms of other stock exchanges. This is largely due to the state-
owned nature of the majority of Chinese industries, as well as the fact that many of the listed 
corporations are relatively new to market and are not yet deeply embedded in foreign markets. 
In SSE, China has moderately stronger connections to the USA compared to SZSE where it is 
very strongly connected to the USA, Germany and India.  
Both SSE and SZSE display China’s strong connection to Hong Kong, serving as an important 
entrepôt for Chinese goods, labor, and capital. In Chinese corporate structures, the Cayman 
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Islands or BVI play an important role in circumventing certain “imperfections” (Buckley et al., 
2013) in the Chinese capital market (Xiao, 2004). Furthermore, as Fichtner (2016) adds, 
“Chinese MNEs have been found to channel direct investment through OFCs (directly and also 
indirectly via Hong Kong) not only to minimize taxes (‘round-tripping’) but also to conceal the 
ownership of assets and to gain access to foreign capital markets” (p.1046).  
The SSE-listed firms are intensely concentrated in Hong Kong, with significant numbers in 
Singapore, BVI, Cayman Islands, and Liberia. Unlike the other exchanges, which exhibit 
relative diversity, 97 percent of THOFC activity is linked to the top 10 jurisdictions, which also 
include Macao, the Netherlands, Bermuda, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Hong Kong-based 
subsidiaries are especially prevalent in the industrials, financials, energy, consumer 
discretionary, materials, information technology, and real estate sectors. Singapore is 
designated as a subsidiary location in industrials, real estate, financials, and materials, while 
Liberian structures are mainly in energy. The BVI is much more significant on the SSE than 
the Cayman Islands, notably in information technology, financials and real estate. Thus 
subsidiaries of knowledge intensive industries are structured directly in sink tax havens, while 
industrials and extractive industries more likely use Hong Kong as a conduit. The large 
involvement of Chinese business in the BVI reflects both a path dependency in investing there, 
as well as the active lobbying of Hong Kong businesses by the BVI during the British handover 
to China in 1997. More recently, the BVI has offered Hong Kong residents access to a special 
registry and Chinese-language services to set up BVI companies remotely. The subsequent 
increase in Hong Kong business has encouraged further Mainland Chinese investment, a large 
amount which is round-tripped (Shaxson, 2014).  
The SZSE network is fairly similar to SSE in that Hong Kong is by far its most significant 
THOFC connection, albeit more focused on information technology. Singapore also features 
prominently as a THOFC in SZSE network, with strong connections to firms in industrials, 
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materials and information technology. Like the SSE, the BVI are the most significant ‘offshore’ 
jurisdiction, particularly important in consumer discretionary and information technology. The 
strong IT orientation of SZSE-listed firms translates to slightly higher connectivity to European 
conduits in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium. For example, companies such as 
mobile phone producer LTE and solar energy firms such as Jiangsu Zhongli and Zhejiang 
Sunflower locate in Switzerland as market conduits to access capital and strong intellectual 
property laws.  
The Tokyo Stock Exchange is sophisticated and complex, reflecting several decades of highly 
globalized industrialization (Figure 6). TSE also demonstrates a regionalization towards the 
Asia-Pacific – albeit slightly lower than that of the ASX – as well as listings of firms from the 
Americas and Middle East. Strong connections to China, Thailand, Taiwan, and India confirm 
the TSE’s Asian orientation, with Japanese firms strongly embedded within regional industry.   
TSE’s primary THOFC connection are to firms registered in Singapore, Hong Kong, the 
Netherlands, Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Due to the nature of Japanese industry, these 
connections are primarily in industrials and information technology. Subsidiaries in the 
Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Ireland, and Luxembourg are strongest in financials, reflecting their 
advantages as sinks. TSE exhibits more subsidiaries, and more connectivity to THOFC than 
other exchanges, and is less concentrated in particular hubs (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, BVI) 
than other exchanges.  
Given the size of the TSE, a large number of non-Japanese firms also list in Tokyo. Consider 
the case of Bank of America, which was listed both on the NASDAQ as well as the TSE (now 
de-listed). The bank’s Tokyo listing had a total of 3839 subsidiaries, many of which were 
partial stakes in large and well-known companies such as Yahoo!, Nordstrom, and Starwood 
hotels. This comprised subsidiaries in 48 countries, of which 83 percent were registered in the 
US. A large number of these subsidiaries were also located in THOFCs, including the Cayman 
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Islands (86) and Bermuda (37). The four most significant subsidiary locations in continental 
Europe were the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, respectively. Thus, while 
it is nearly impossible to know the logic behind any given structure, the overall pattern is 
consistent with other firms listed on the TSE.  
 
Discussion 
Each of the five networks present similarities and differences in the way nations both globalize 
and engage with tax evasion or secret activities.  Firms in Australia and Japan have significantly 
more complex corporate structures than those in India and China, through there appears to be 
little variation in the degree of engagement with THOFC across the five. Thus, it is the 
geographical distribution of each exchange’s THOFC connectivities that differ, with Chinese 
exchanges structured more directly through Hong Kong and the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of BVI-
Bermuda-Caymans. The hub and spoke ‘star’ shape of the three China and India network 
speaks to their highly centralized or command-and-control approach to globalization and 
international market penetration. Further, the overly strong influence of the Chinese state limits 
not only the degree to which companies globalize, but also how this globalization plays out 
geographically. As Buckley et al. (2013) state, “the most important reason for Chinese firms to 
specifically favor the Cayman Islands as a base for their listing vehicles is that it allows them 
to minimize their costs of raising capital” (p.115).  Thus, the relative prevalence of the Hong 
Kong-BVI-Cayman triad evinces a relatively straightforward pattern in the majority of Chinese 
cases. This suggests that the drivers underlying THOFC activity may have to do with capital 
raising more than tax avoidance, as others have suggested.   
Tied to the geopolitical story embedded in the networks is the strong regionalization of the 
stock exchanges supporting the case that geography matters in explaining how the off-shore 
world is globally networked through firm structures (Haberly, & Wójcik, 2015). The 
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connectivity of Indian firms to the UAE and Mauritius is clearly linked to socio-historical 
linkages, as well as Dubai’s recent rise as a regional intermediary in the case of the former 
(Sigler, 2013). Australia-based firms have a small but significant number of subsidiaries in 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Samoa. Hong Kong’s physical proximity to mainland China is 
no doubt influential in its strong role in the SSE and SZSE market listings. Singapore’s position 
is reinforced both by its role as a contemporary Asian ‘global city’ and as a former British 
colonial port with a significant Chinese diasporic population. Together, these embedded 
network geographies support Haberly and Wójcik (2015) arguments regarding the existence of 
‘regional blocks and imperial legacies’ in the global offshore network. The five networks 
corroborate their findings regarding a ‘core’ comprised of the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ plus the four 
or five most prevalent European conduits, supplemented by regional specificities that are 
influenced by sector – such as mining in Australia – or socio-cultural ties.  
Nonetheless, other findings suggest circuits of capital follow alternative forms of proximity. A 
large number of identified THOFC are current or former British dependencies of one kind or 
another, and it has been suggested common frameworks – such as the application of common 
law – may be a reason. Another reason may be the economic profile of Asia-Pacific listed 
firms, which represent the region’s global industrial role more so than the service economies 
of North America and Europe. The fact that Shenzhen’s information technology firms are so 
active in establishing THOFC subsidiaries suggests a future trend, particularly toward conduits 
with strong IP rights. Furthermore, as Jones and Temouri (2016) note, MNCs “classified as 
being located in liberal market economies (LMEs) are more likely to undertake tax haven 
activity compared with MNEs from coordinated market economies (CMEs)” (p. 238).  
Conclusion 
This paper adds a network dimension to locational theories on MNC strategy to explain how 
THOFC are integrated into the structures of firms listed in the Asia-Pacific region. Drawing 
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upon data from the five stock exchanges, it focusses on THOFC as ‘nodes’ within global 
corporate networks. Two key findings are extracted from the resulting analysis. First, we 
corroborate previous research that THOFC are embedded within a broad range of global firm 
activities, and that on one hand the degree to which is determined by structural forces. Across 
all five exchanges there was a significant presence of THOFC, which García-Bernardo (2017) 
roughly categorizes as conduits, sinks, and hybrids. Conduits such as the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Ireland were prevalent in each network, particularly within the financials and 
information technology sectors. This suggests a strong role as market entry conduits, 
particularly into the European Union. Singapore also served as a regional conduit in all 
networks. Sinks including the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ were observed in every network, and it is 
hypothesized that if second-order subsidiaries (e.g., subsidiaries of subsidiaries) had been 
examined, more such structures would have emerged. It is likely that as newer THOFC become 
more sophisticated, they will to some degree displace more developed ones such as Bermuda 
and Panama.  
Second, geographical variation within the networks is on the other hand explained by the logics 
of firm strategy, and motives for MNC activity (national context and firm strategies). This adds 
to the internationalization literature within IB, as THOFC activity is derived from firm-specific 
advantages relating to tax and regulatory frameworks rather than the frequently cited factors of 
cheap labour, access to markets, access to knowledge, etcetera.  Regional patterns are observed 
to some degree, particularly in the case of BSE-listed firms in UAE and Mauritius. Further, it 
finds that the variety of capitalism also plays a role in how firms globalize through THOFCs. 
Chinese firms almost invariably structure themselves through Hong Kong, with a common 
connection to the Cayman Islands or BVI. Whereas European strategies tend to rest on ‘treaty 
shopping’ - Switzerland providing the advantage of being outside the EU for compliance 
purposes, and Luxembourg, Ireland, and Netherlands within it. Access to capital is also critical, 
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with Chinese firms raising funds through overseas subsidiaries. In sum, no one strategy fits 
each company profile, but certain commonalities suggest a combination of regulatory and tax 
arbitrage lead to outcomes that are strongly shaped by geography and history. This becomes 
apparent when firm locational decisions were aggregated into their respective networks, and 
resultant structures were analyzed. 
Indeed, as Jones and Temouri (2016) suggest, variety of capitalism matters more than tax rates 
and this is generally true based on industrial and geographical variation. India’s highly 
regulated domestic sector exhibits THOFC connectivities primarily through its large MNCs, 
contrasting starkly with Australia’s highly globalized materials and energy sectors, whose 
THOFC connections are well-established. And despite the nominally socialist orientation of 
the Chinese state or the strong relationship between Japan’s industrial and financial sectors, we 
provide evidence that firms across a variety of geographical contexts pursue common corporate 
strategies that incorporate THOFC. 
Finally, we argue that it is important to consider the novel ways in which THOFC activity 
might diverge from previous modes and motives – particularly as East Asian export-led models 
become increasingly significant on a global scale. Further, as new digital platforms (e.g. the 
sharing economy) and payment mechanisms (e.g. cryptocurrencies) enable increasing ease in 
cross-border financial transactions, understanding the role of THOFC is a vital step toward 
cogent and viable policy solutions to support firm activity while curbing irregular flows.   
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APPENDIX – DATA: Top 25 Network Metrics for Five Asia-Pacific Stock Exchanges: ASX, TSE, SSE, SZSE and BSE 
  
ASX 
   
TSE 
   
SSE 




   
 
BC2 DC EC BC DC EC BC DC EC BC DC EC BC DC EC 
Australia 96.77 1.00 0.67 Japan 87.59 0.98 0.60 China 1.00 1.00 0.71 China 1.00 1.00 0.71 India 1.00 1.00 0.71 
New 
Zealand 
2.53 0.24 0.25 USA 13.39 0.47 0.38 UAE  0.01 0.07 UAE  0.01 0.07 UAE  0.01 0.06 
Bermuda 0.23 0.09 0.13 Malaysia 0.19 0.08 0.12 Argentina  0.01 0.07 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
 0.01 0.07 Albania  0.01 0.06 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.02 0.03 0.08 Hong Kong  0.02 0.08 Austria  0.01 0.07 Albania  0.01 0.07 Angola  0.01 0.06 
UK 0.01 0.03 0.08 Cayman  0.02 0.08 Australia  0.01 0.07 Austria  0.01 0.07 Argentina  0.01 0.06 
B.Virgin Is.  0.02 0.07 Australia  0.02 0.07 Azerbaijan  0.01 0.07 Australia  0.01 0.07 Austria  0.01 0.06 
China  0.02 0.08 China  0.02 0.07 Barbados  0.01 0.07 Barbados  0.01 0.07 Australia  0.01 0.06 
Germany  0.02 0.08 France  0.02 0.07 Belgium  0.01 0.07 Bangladesh  0.01 0.07 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 0.01 0.06 
Hong Kong  0.02 0.08 UK  0.02 0.07 
Burkina 
Faso 
 0.01 0.07 Belgium  0.01 0.07 Barbados  0.01 0.06 
Malaysia  0.02 0.08 Indonesia  0.02 0.07 Bulgaria  0.01 0.07 Bulgaria  0.01 0.07 Bangladesh  0.01 0.06 
Singapore  0.02 0.08 Lebanon  0.02 0.07 Bermuda  0.01 0.07 Bermuda  0.01 0.07 Belgium  0.01 0.06 
USA  0.02 0.08 Netherlands  0.02 0.07 Brunei  0.01 0.07 Brunei  0.01 0.07 
Burkina 
Faso 
 0.01 0.06 
UAE  0.01 0.07 Singapore  0.02 0.07 Bolivia  0.01 0.07 Brazil  0.01 0.07 Bulgaria  0.01 0.06 
Brazil  0.01 0.07 Thailand  0.02 0.07 Brazil  0.01 0.07 Belarus  0.01 0.07 Bahrain  0.01 0.06 
Canada  0.01 0.07 
South 
Africa 
 0.02 0.07 Bahamas  0.01 0.07 Canada  0.01 0.07 Bermuda  0.01 0.06 
Switzerland  0.01 0.07 UAE  0.01 0.06 Canada  0.01 0.07 Congo  0.01 0.07 Brunei  0.01 0.06 
Chile  0.01 0.07 Argentina  0.01 0.06 
Dem. 
R.Congo 
 0.01 0.07 Switzerland  0.01 0.07 Bolivia  0.01 0.06 
Spain  0.01 0.07 Austria  0.01 0.06 Congo  0.01 0.07 Ivory Coast  0.01 0.07 Brazil  0.01 0.06 
Finland  0.01 0.07 Belgium  0.01 0.06 Switzerland  0.01 0.07 Chile  0.01 0.07 Bahamas  0.01 0.06 
Fiji  0.01 0.07 Bahrain  0.01 0.06 Ivory Coast  0.01 0.07 Colombia  0.01 0.07 Bhutan  0.01 0.06 
France  0.01 0.07 Bermuda  0.01 0.06 Chile  0.01 0.07 Cyprus  0.01 0.07 Botswana  0.01 0.06 
Indonesia  0.01 0.07 Bolivia  0.01 0.06 Cameroon  0.01 0.07 Czechia  0.01 0.07 Canada  0.01 0.06 
Ireland  0.01 0.07 Brazil  0.01 0.06 Colombia  0.01 0.07 Germany  0.01 0.07 
Dem. 
R.Congo 
 0.01 0.06 
India  0.01 0.07 Bahamas  0.01 0.06 Cyprus  0.01 0.07 Denmark  0.01 0.07 Congo  0.01 0.06 
Japan  0.01 0.07 Canada  0.01 0.06 Czechia  0.01 0.07 Algeria  0.01 0.07 China  0.01 0.06 
                                                 
2 BC is Betweenness Centrality. DC is Degree Centrality. EG is Eigenvector Centrality. 
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